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60 J. MICHAEL
a. Commercial secrecy in common law countries
Outside the statutory monopolies, there is little use of the criminal law to protect 
commercial information in common law countries. The law in both England and 
Ireland is that information cannot be stolen. 14 An action for breach of confidence 
is a civil action. The basic requirements are that the information concerned be of a 
confidential nature (that is, not generally known); that the information be 
communicated under an express or implied obligation of confidentiality; and that 
there has been or is likely to be a breach of that obligation of confidentiality by 
someone who knows or should know of the obligation. The judicial remedies are 
injunction to prevent a breach, damages after a breach, and an accounting for profits 
after a breach. 
b. Commercial secrecy in civil law countries
lsommercial secrecy apart from the statutory monopolies in civil law countries 
see,ms to be almost entirely a matter of criminal law. Belgium provides a criminal 
offènce of disclosing an industrial secret of an employer or former employer. 15 
The civil code on unfair competition establishes a civil action in unfair 
competition concerning industrial and commercial secrets. French law protects 
industrial secrets in the criminal law. 16 The German Criminal Code makes it an 
offence for anyone who has been formally obliged to keep secrecy to breach the 
obligation. 17 The ltalian Penal Code makes it an offence to disclose scientific or
industrial secrets in breach of confidence for unfair advantage. 18 The Italian Civil
Code also imposes an obligation on employees not to disclose information to their 
employer's detriment, 19 and a further obligation not to use information for unfair
competi�ion. 20 Luxembourg has a general criminal offence of disclosing
commercial secrets for purposes of causing competitive harm. 21 Article 273 of the









Oxford v. Moss (1978) Cr. Law Rep. 
Article 309 Penal Code. 
Article 418 Penal Code. 
s. 353b StGB.
Art. 623 Codice Penale.
Art 2105 Codice Civile.
Art 2598 Codice Civile.
s, 309, Code Penal et Code d'instruction Criminelle.
Effect of Fair Trading Laws on the 
Commercialization of Data Held by the
Public Sector 
C. de Terwangne
The commercialization of its information resources leads the public sector to
intervene in an information market which the private sector most likely already
plays a role in. The government is a major producer of information. It is also a
privileged and essential one, given the frequently obligatory character attached to its
data collection and the exclusivity of the resources in its possession. Its entry into
the open market may either derive from its own initiative or be imposed upon it
within the context of its public service mission. 
The public sector's presence on the open market takes different forms,
ranging from government offices (such as the Ministry of economic affairs or the
National Institute of Statistics), public institutions charged with a particular
mission to disseminate information of general interest to the public (the national
Bank is an example), State-owned companies (Belgacom, France Tl com,
Deutsche Bundespost, among whose fonctions is the distribution of a telephone
directory), through to partnerships between a government office and a private
company (the commercialization of the Dutch Motor Vehicle Register via the
intermediary of the RAI Data Centrum, a private company, or the creation, by the
Italian Chambers of Commerce, of the private company CERVED charged with
setting up an automated register of companies, or the association of a German
Chamber of Commerce with a private company offering an information research
service, ... ). 
The rules of the game that define and organize relations between the various
actors on the market are equally varied. The prerogatives associated with the
exploitation of a dominant position, or the interplay of free and fair competition,
such different regimes are justified by the existence or non-existence of a public
service mission to inform. 
I - TO WHATDEGREE MA Y THE PUBLIC SECTOR INTERVEN
E ON THE OPEN
MARKET AS A COMMERCIAL OPERATOR?
The majority of States currently permit the presence of the public sector on the
open market. If this presence was only authorized i_n a restricte_d 
context origin�lly,
today it tends more and more to overflow the strict boundar1es of the pursmt of
public interest to which it was, in the past, limited. . , _ . . . 
As to the question of the extent of the public sector s part1c1pat10n m the
development of an information market, two opposing conceptions arise.
- The first, enunciated in the Commission of the European Communities'
8th Guideline for improving the synergy between the public and 
private sectors in










62 C. DE TERWANGNE
vision of the role of the State. This conception includes offering privileged status 
to a private sector intermediary while confining the intervention of the public 
sector to those situations that demonstrate a private sector deficiency. The 8th
Guideline is quite explicit in this regard, when it says that 
'before establishing a new electronic information service or continuing an 
existing one, public administrations should consider whether an existing 
private sector service can be used or adapted to meet their requirements'. 
This conception is inspired by the policy practised during the eighties in the United 
States in conformity with the directives contained in the Circular A-130 issued by 
the Office of Management and Budget, particularly : 
'Agencies shall ( ... ) (9) disseminate such information products and services 
as are (a) specifically required by law, or (b) necessary for the proper 
performance of agency fonctions, provided that the latter do not duplicate 
similar products or services that are or would otherwise be provided by other 
government or private sector organizations; ( ... ) (11) disseminate such 
government information products and services : ( ... ) (b) in the manner 
most cost effective for the government, including placing maximum feasible 
reliance on the private sector for the dissemination of the products or 
services.'. 
In recent years, American policy has changed and the government is today guided 
by a totally different current more allied to the second conception, dealt with below. 
The example of the INSEE, the French National Institute of Statistics and 
Economie Studies, illustrates this philosophy of role-sharing in the marketplace. 
The Institute disposes of resources, both technical and human, and of such 
experience in the field as to confer upon it a de facto monopoly (without going into 
the legal obligation deriving from the definition of its public service mission) by 
virtue of the sheer extent of its research and enquiries for the numerous statistical 
studies on the French society and the French economy that it has undertaken. The 
costs involved in such a broad census of the population could not be assumed by a 
private company, still less by several private companies in competition. On the 
other hand, these studies, used either by the government or by local authorities, 
represent a collective utility which can justifiably be financed out of taxes. The 
commercial exploitation of the results of these diverse statistical studies is made on 
the basis of the diffusion by INSEE of a certain number of standardized products. 
INSEE does not consider that designing a study concept to suit a client forms part 
of its mission (although the possibility is left open for exceptional cases). The 
limit imposed by the INSEE on the commercialization of its products is twofold : 
the information concerned must be of interest to the public or a particular 
community, and the cost of establishing such an information product must be 
high, that is to say, it must be unsuitable for exploitation by the priva.te sector. 
Commercialization outside these parameters is not entirely excluded, but would be 
more selective. 
This tendency arouses entirely different reactions. 
On one hand, care must be taken to see that the possible right of access of all 
citizens to information held by the public sector, a right established under general 
1 
l 
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or specific laws, be not endangered by private sector appropriation of that 
information. Private sector agents having control of public files may not inhibit 
public access where such access is legally guaranteed. 
On the other hand, the public sector is itself interested in profiting from the 
resources it holds. In France, with regard to the example of the INSEE given here, 
certain voices have been heard raised on behalf of private sector suppliers of 
information services, denouncing the INSEE's attitude as tending to over 
commercialize itself. One factor can be regarded here as incentive : budgetary 
restrictions imposed on the public sector. The production of information involves 
high costs. Consequently the public sector endeavours to draw revenue from this 
activity and to profit from the market thus opened by organizing at least a partial 
return on the investments it has made. 
Finall y, this first conception of the opportunity to be gained by entering the 
open information market can also present a danger to the free and fair development 
of competition. If already existing private structures - which the government is 
invited to entrust with the commercialization of its information - are limited, or 
if a single private service satisfies the requirements, this tends to grant exclusivity 
or quasi-exclusivity for commercialization to a single private company or small 
minority of the same. 
- The second conception, the very opposite of that which we have just
described, accords complete freedom to the public sector to commercialize its 
information products, but on the condition that this is done on an equal footing 
with the private sector. 
Such a commercialization policy imposes a strict distinction between public 
service (with a prerogative regime) (Il) and any competitive activity (under 
conditions of equality) (III) pursued by the government concerned. 
Il - PUBLIC INFORMATION SERVICES 
A. Definition and Organization of Public Information Services
The public sector is required to diffuse the information it has gathered in certain 
areas of activity. This is understood in terms of making a public service available 
(commercial registers open to everyone, distribution by clerks of the courts of 
judicial decisions, placing electoral lists at the disposai of the public, ... ). Within 
the framework of legislations to regulate the right of public access to 
administrative information, these texts are seen as conferring upon civil services a 
general mission to inform the public. The object of that mission, far from limiting 
itself to the minimal obligation of enabling documents to be consulted on site, 
consists rather more in the duty of assuring general access to governmental 
information products. This implies that, even if such access can be assured by the 
consultation of document originals on paper, it should be available through 
telematic means in ail situations where such means have been set up to serve the 
needs of the administration concerned. 1 Furthermore, this access bears upon the
s.Y.POULLET, The Commercialization of Data held by the Public Sector, Legitimacy and
1 1 ,, : ,1 
1 ! 
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administration's information products and not merely on the raw data. 
_ To a�complish it_s pub_lic ��rvice mission, an administrative department may 
arm ltself with prerogahves, JUstlfied by the concem to permit general access to the 
information products released by the public sector and to guarantee the quality of 
the data fumished by them. 
Such a regime, lying as it does outside the scope of common laws of fair 
trade, �inds its _ ju�tific��ion in paragraph 2 of article 90 of the EEC Treaty. 
Accordmg to this disposition, once a proposed information service can be described 
as serving t�e general economic �nterest, the authorities charged with managing 
such a service are no longer reqmred to respect Community rulings on fair trade 
where these pose a legal or de facto barrier to the accomplishment of their mission. 
_ . _At this point we might pause to reflect on the recent legislative and judicial
defmitlon of the theory of 'obligatory licences'. This theory stands at the cross­
�oad� o±: inte�lectual copyright laws and the laws of fair trade with regard to the 
imphcatlons it bas for the information market. Mention should be made of it here 
even if the discussion it merits must be reserved for the chapter of this study tha; 
\ specifically concems copyright. 
\ Under the terms of article 8 of the draft Directive on the legal protection of 
data bases, 2 it is obligatory to grant exploitation licences in all cases where the 
information contained in a data base accessible to the general public is not available 
elsewhere. This arrangement was first addressed directly to those authorities who 
disseminate information within the framework of a legal obligation. It was aimed 
esse1:1tially at cases of commercialization of data products deriving from a public
s _ervice. 3 In t�e second version of the draft Directive, the system of 'obligatory
hcen��s• apphes not only to public authorities, but also to private entities 
benefitmg from a legal or de facto monopolistic position. 
B. A Narrow Determination of Markets
It is advisable to reveal one characteristic of the application of the laws of fair trade 
to !he info�mation market. The latter takes the form of a collection of particularly 
stnctly defmed markets (a market for every category of information, an information 
market to respond to a particular public need, ... ). This leads in tum to a restrained 
c":cu_mscript_ion _of the scope of the derogatory ruling justified by the public service 
miss10n, which m paralle� leads to the identification of such markets as are beyond 
the rang� of such a r�lmg_. The French example in the case of meteorology perfectly dlustrates the situation. The French Conseil de la Concurrence (Fair Trade 
2 
3 
conditions, 'Computer Law and Security Report', 1993, vol. 9, n°5, pp. 227 ff. Contrary to the 
argument ofMr._ Gaudrat (�h. GAUDRAT, 'Commercialisation des données publiques', Paris, La Documentat10n Française, 1992), consultation by telematic means does not run more 
co��ter to the principle of equality than consultation on site. Sorne people have access to a 
1':f1mtel mod�le at home, others do not. A flagrant difference exists similarly, in the case of on 
site consultatmn, between those who live close to the central authority and those much farther 
afield? a �iffe?ce measurable in terms. of bath time and expense. Respect for the principle of 
equahty 1mphes that access to techmcal means necessary for the exercising of a right be 
made equally available to ail. 
J.O.C.E., n· C 156, 23 June 1992, p. 4. 
"!'f e shal) see th�t Euroi:iean jurisprudence has applied the theory of obligatory licences to 
mformauon services wh1ch go beyond public service (see below). 
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Council) was recently occupied with an affair involving the Direction
 de la
M t  orologie Nationale (D.M.N.). 
4 This latter had developed two information 
services : one, a commercial exploitation of its data in the form of a telep
hone 
service offering meteorological information to the general public, the ot
her, a
service of aerial navigation information destined for the airline companies
. In the 
market of meteorological information by telephone, the D.M.N. enjoy
ed a
dominant position. The Soci t du Journal Tl phon (pub�isher of the pho
ne 
directory), a private company wishing to create a rival service, asked the D.M
.N.
for permission to use their coded aeronautical _ messages. !�e govemment 
wa�
opposed to this demand and refused it, a refusal viewed as legit�m�te by t�e Co
nseil
de la Concurrence on the grounds of security connected to certam mtemational S
tate 
obligations (aeronautical information is reserved by international c?nv_e1:1tion
s f�r 
aircraft operators). In retrospect, the refusai would not have bee1:1 JUstified h
ad �t 
been a matter of providing information of a general meteorological nature
. This 
would have represented an abuse by the D.M.N. of its dominant po�itio1:1, depri
v�ng
a competitor, directly or indirectly, of all sources of meteorological mforma
tlon 
that would enable him to stay in business . 
Two markets were therefore identified in this affair, liable to two different 
rulings. In the first, the dominant position of a govemment institution was 
f�und
to be justified, while in the second the administration would have b_een cons
tramed 
to supply data for commercialization to the private sector, even if the la
tter had 
thereby become a direct competitor. 
C. Conditions of Offer in Public Information Services
An analogy with the rules of the Open Network Provision_ (ONP) define� by
_ the 
European Community within the framework of the pub_hc teleco_m1?umca
h?ns 
service, 5 enables us to clarify the conditions of offer m a pubhc mformat
lon 




As far as pricing is concemed, govemments must respect the principle of gra
tuity
so often enunciated by national legislations (and principally by the laws_ o
f access 
to administrative documents). This principle does not mean that the entrre 
cost of
making such an information service available to the public must be a�sum
ed by the
govemment. The authorities are authorized to charge a costs-based pnce. In
 the case 
of a minimal information service, the costs that could be charged to the pe
rson who 





Décision n° 92-D-35 du Conseil de la Concurrence, 13 mai 1992, relat
ive à une_ saisin� de la
Société du Journal télévisé à l'encontre de la Direction de la M
étéorologie Nat10nale,
B.O.C.C.RF., 6juillet 1992, p. 224. 
Particularly the Council Directive n· 90/387 CE1? fr?m the 28 Ju
ne 1990 relatI�e to the
establishment of an interior market in telecommumcat10n services
 through the settmg-up of 
an open telecommunications network, J.O.C.E., L 192/1 24 July 19
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concemed and a standard charge for the research necessary to locate it. On the other 
hand, once the public service carries an enhanced value designed either to assure its 
availability to everyone (such as the setting-up of a service centre, the renting of 
lines, the establishment of public terminais), or to improve a data product that was 
first designed strictly to serve the needs of the administrative department (such as 
!he addi!ion of �n expert system with a view to aiding understanding of the
mformat�on prov1ded), then t�e costs to be taken into account when establishing 
rates for mcreased access may mclude supplementary charges designed t6 cover any 
extra administrative costs. 
Such a tariff policy assumes that, in any case, all charges involved in the 
collecting and elaboration of the product, which are necessary to fulfil the internai 
needs of the department concerned, should be covered only by the latter and should 
in no wise be reflected in the price charged to external users of the service. This 
corresponds to the policy recommended by the 4th Guideline, which stipulates that 
'a price should be established which reflects the costs of preparing and 
passing (the information) to the private sector, but which does not 
necessarily include the full cost of collecting and handling (the information) 
in the course of routine administration'. 
A differentiation in the rates of charges may occur. Certain governments may 
choose to distinguish between the final user and the commercial user who intends 
to exploit the information for profit. Such is the case with the INSEE in France 7 
and the operators of legal data bases in Italy. However, tariff principles are currently 
undergoing review and this distinction may well be abandoned in future, even 
though it may seem legitimate to make the person who intends to commercially re­
use the information pay more (notably by charging a royalty for each use of the 
data). In any event, it is difficult at the outset to monitor the personal or 
commercial finalities of private sector use. 
p. Publicity and non-discrimination
In order to guarantee the equal footing of companies desirous of using the economic 
opportunity thus presented to establish commercial services on the basis of 
government data, the 4th Guideline invites the public sector to take the necessary 
publicity steps to inform the private sector of 
'the availability of basic data and information, and ( ... ) of the procedures by 
which it can be obtained and used or exploited'. 
The principle of publicity is to be understood as a corollary to the principle of non­
discrimination. The tariff and user conditions of such an information service must 
be the subject of a publication in order that they may become generaily known to 
everyone. The choice of method or medium for such publicity is left to the 
discretion of the public authority concerned, so long as the potential users are 
7 See in this respect J.HUET and H. MAISL, 'Droit de l'informatique et des télécomunications' 
Paris, Li tee, 1989, pp. 596 ff. 
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thereby made aware of the information sources on offer by the government, the
characteristics of the products available and the terms of access.
It is equally by applying the principle of non-discrimination that the 5th
Guideline insists that 
'when public sector information or data is released for exploitation by the 
private sector, restrictions should not normally be placed on the types of 
customers ( ... ).' 
This accords with the principle of general and equal public access to information 
enunciated in the laws of access. 
In the same way, access to data must not be solely by way of advanced 
technologies. The information should be equally accessible both for large and small 
companies. This implies that data be made available to the public in different 
formats rather than only being accessible by means of top of the line technology 
such as on-line consultation or the acquisition of CD-Rom. One must observe 
however, that while it is desirable to give the same chance to all potential 
operators, the exploitation of information can only be rendered viable and feasible 
when the data is available on electronic support media. 
c. Normalization
The conditions of use for information services may be 'normalized'. Normalization
here is not only technical - a description of conditions for interconnecting with
the broker centre, for example - but equally organizational - fixing the opening
times of offices, ... 
D. Tendering of a Public Information Service by a Third Party
The case envisaged here is when public authorities have recourse to a private 
operator or create a subsidiary, either with or without external capital, to assure that 
the information service is made available to the general public. Examples are not 
lacking and are largely explained by the desire of the government to take advantage 
of specialized abilities that cannot be found internally, or to move the financing of 
certain activities outside the State budget. 
a. Selection of partners
If the commercialization of public information services makes use of private 
enterprise intermediaries, the selection of partners by the public authority must take 
place in conformity with the regulations governing public service conc�ssions or 
the assigning of public markets. Thus, some people were upset recently m France 
by the system under which the national register of stolen cheques was 
commercialized by the Bank of France. A law passed on 30 December 1991 8 
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places the responsibility of assuring the regularity of a cheque on the Bank of 
France. Currently the commercialization of this register is restricted to a single 
private operator, without the latter having passed through the standard procedure of 
tendering an offer. In reply to a senator's question, the minister responsible affirmed 
that the decree of application of the law, currently being drawn up, would redefine 
the parameters for the commercialization of this register 9. 
Furthermore, according to the terms of articles 59 et seq. of the Treaty of 
Rome, the public sector may not in any degree discriminate on the basis of the 
nationality of companies tendering an offer of commercialization. 
In cases where more than one private company is chosen to commercialize a 
service, no privilege and no discriminatory clause may be permitted to restrict or 
dissolve the equality that must exist between partners within the same category. 
Finally, Community law (article 92 §1 of the Treaty of Rome) condemns 
direct or indirect aid wherewith the State 'falsifies competition to the benefit of 
certain companies', whether such companies are public or private. 
b. Exclusive rights
In principle therefore, no company may benefit from a competitive advantage 
which is denied to others. However, the public sector has the right to support 
certain sectors of the economy, which can mean certain companies. A private 
company could, as a result, find itself holding, by exclusive clause, a monopoly in 
the diffusion of public information. In any event, the creation of differentiated 
treatment for companies is only permissible, to adopt the terms of the Court of 
Appeal of Brussels, 10 if the decision rests on legal and reasonable criteria (such as 
economic justification). 11 The inroads made on the equality of treatment must be 
justified either by differences in situation or by reasons of public interest. 12 It was 
because such criteria were not respected, and notably because the exclusivity of the 
concession was founded upon no major consideration of public interest, that the 
monopoly granted by the Belgian ministry of transport to a professional 
association for the commercialization of the national motor vehicle register has 
been declared illegal by the Brussels jurisdiction. An administrative court in 
Germany was called upon to pronounce on the legitimacy of the exclusivity 
reserved by a competent tribunal for fiscal matters for a professional financial 
newspaper. This newspaper was alone in being informed of the tribunal's decisions. 
The court, appealed to by a rival publication, ordered that an end be put to this state 
of affairs, as it jeopardised the function of the judicial system in its entirety, 





J.C.P. 1992, llI, 65289.
Reply to written question n° 20227, J.O.Sénat (Q), 9 April 1992, 872.
Brussels, 17 September 1981, J. T., 1982, p.412, note P. QUERTAINMONT.
The judicial instances in Strasbourg have specified the conditions that admit di�criminatory
practice : provided thatthe destinction has a legitimate goal, that is to say that it can be 
reasonably and objective1.y justified, taking into account the goal and the effects of the 
measure in question; and provided that a reasonabble and proportional relationship exists 
between the means employed and the end envisaged (E.C.H.R., judgement of 23 July 1968, 
certain aspects of the linguistic regulations in Belgian schools case, 'Yearbook of the
European Convention ofHuman Rights', 1968, p.833 et seq.) 
P.QUERTAINMONT, note under Brussels, 17 September 1981, J.T., 1982 p.415. 
• 
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criticism of judicial decisions. The court found that the task of publicizing judicial 
decisions could well be entrusted to private sector agents, but only on condition 
that the fundamental constitutional principles of press freedom and equality be 
respected. 13
Two French examples illustrate, on the other hand, hypotheses of 
legitimacy in the granting of monopolies. In one case, a private data service has 
recently been granted the rights to diffusion of all legal texts, rulings and 
jurisprudence. Exclusivity is here based on the minimal financial viability of the 
market and the heavy responsibility of taking in charge the exhaustive distribution 
of legal texts. In another case, one of the INSEE's first partners, operating a 
genuine commercial exploitation of census data for marketing purposes (developed 
on the basis of local data drawn from INSEE data), benefited at the outset from an 
exclusivity clause in the form of a public service concession. Upon expiry 
however the contract was not renewed under the same terms. the company in 
question' still works with the INSEE, but as one partner among others, since, due 
to the expansion of the market, exclusivity was no longer seen as justified. 
The 6th Guideline agrees entirely with the position described above. It says 
that 
'contracts or other arrangements with private sector data base providers or 
host services should not grant exclusive rights if they lead to distortion of 
competition'. 
It specifies further that 
'if, for reasons such as the penetration of a new market or provision of a 
service in the public interest, an exclusive right is deemed necessary, it 
should be subject to regular review.' 
When a civil service does not take in hand the commercialization of its own data, 
but refers to a private sector intermediary, the principle of general access to the 
public instituted by certain legislations justifies the imposition of particulars of 
sale on the company enjoying exclusive rights. Such specifications would 
guarantee the respect by private enterprise of the conditions of the conce�sion 
imposed on its administration ( conditions of price, accessibility of even non-viable 
data, conditions regarding the language in which the information is available ... ). 
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fil - SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION SERVICES 
A. The Position of the Public Sector on the Supplementary Service Market
Beyond the commercialization of basic information services, the government has 
the right to provide supplementary services. This may however lead to serious 
problems of competition, given the fact that the activities of the private sector are 
principally occupied with the provision of such services. 
Before setting-up a new electronic information service or operating an 
already existent one, the 8th Guideline calls on governments to 'consider whether 
an existing private sector service can be used or adapted to meet their requirements'. 
An administrative department wishing to introduce a secondary information service 
must undertake preliminary investigations to ascertain whether the service could 
not as well be offered by a private sector operator or whether it may not be 
desirable that the private sector co-operates in production or distribution. This step 
m�y lead to the establishing of partnerships with the private sector, the technique 
of joint ventures developed in particular in the Netherlands. 14 
B. Tendering Conditions for Supplementary Information Services
Since the provision of a supplementary information service does not fall within the 
area of public service, no privilege can be accorded within this framework to the 
public sector beyond those accorded to private operators (a). Indeed, the government 
must take care not to falsify or restrict the free play of competition on the market 
(b). 
a. Public sector on equal footing with private sector
Here again, the analogy with the telecommunications sector seems pertinent. 15 
On no account may an administration commercialize supplementary services on the 
basis of cross-subsidisation, whereby the extension of its activities is financed by 
the profits resulting from its public service mission. On the other hand, complete 
equality in conditions of access to the public information service should be 
observed with regard to the private sector. This means that the government must 
apply to itself the same pricing regulations and interface norms as are binding on 




C.I.Th. BIERLAAGH, 'Produkten, diensten en distributie van overheidsinformatie : een
inventarisatie', in opdracht van de RABIN, Den Haag, 1992, unpublished.
s. Y. POULLET, op.cit.
This conceivably implies, at the very least, the setting-up of profit centres or branches with 
separate accounting procedures. 
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b. Limitations of unfair trading practices
The majority of Member States of the European Community explicitly submit the 
commercial activities of public bodies to the same limitations with regard to unfair 
trading practices as apply to the private sector. Similarly, restrictive practice and, 
principally, the abuse of a dominant position are firmly countered. 
The matter is equally subject to the essential provisions of the Treaty of 
Rome. Under the terms of article 90 of the EEC Treaty, no specific regulatory 
framework that runs counter to the rules of fair trade may be accorded to public 
sector companies. To the degree that a government intervenes directly as an agent 
on the information market, it is obliged to observe articles 85 et seq. of the Treaty, 
which condemn practices restrictive to the free exercise of competition, and 
principally article 86, under which the abuse of a dominant position is forbidden. A 
dominant position is then considered abusive when it 
'acts as an obstacle ( ... ) to the maintenance of the current degree of 
competition in the market or to the development of the same'. 17 
On that basis the London Stock Exchange was lead to review its policy. The 
L.S.E. regulations required British companies to forward, as a first priority, any
information that could effect prices. Only after publication of such information by
the L.S.E. companies were permitted to communicate the information to the
various press agencies. The London Stock Exchange, taking advantage of its
dominant position in the financial information market, had thereby given itself an
appreciable advantage as regards access to such information. 1t thus handicapped any
press agency which might choose to set-up a rival service. Following an enquiry
and a Department of Trade and Industry report on the facts of the case, the L.S.E.
agreed to modify its ruling to permit U.K. comranies to simultaneously transmit
such price related information to press agencies. 8 
I. Dominant position and obligatory licences
Similarly, a position of market dominance can result in exclusive rights attaching 
to intellectual property. Here we find once again, in the case of derived services, the 
theory of obligatory licences already encountered within the framework of public 
data services. This theory found an application in the Magill case, recently 
submitted to the Court of First Instance of the European Community. 19 The 
Court, basing its judgement on the interdiction against abuse of a dominant 
position, condemned the BBC to grant a reproduction licence for its television 
programme information to the rival Magill company. lt considered that to make 
use of a monopoly deriving from copyright to prevent the diffusion of a new 
product in a neighbouring market, constituted an abuse of the dominant position 
resulting from that monopoly. 
The European Community Court of Justice has previously argued in terms 
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of the abuse of a dominant position with regard to the exploitation of rights of 
intellectual property. It has thus established as indefensible the granting of licences 
for exorbitant rentai fees, or the prevention of a third party from providing a service 
when one is oneself not responding to consumer demand for the service in 
question. 20
2. Dominant position and essential facilities
The European Communities Commission has, also on the basis of abuse of a 
dominant position, introduced the doctrine of essential facilities recently developed 
in the United States. The Commission's decision 21 concerned a dispute between
Sealink and a rival company, B&I, regarding a regulation imposed by Sealink: on 
the use of a port belonging to them but used by both rivais. B&I argued that the 
schedule laid down by Sealink was gravely prejudicial to their business. The 
Commission agreed and, seeing in the port an example of essentialfacilities, ruled 
that EEC article 86 imposes that both competitors be permitted access to it under 
equal conditions.· 
The doctrine of essential facilities is but new-born, but its application to the 
information market could oblige a government, under threat of falling foui of the 
laws on abuse of a dominant position, to permit private sector operators access to 
its information resources, inasmuch as these constitute a sort of essential facility. 
The first criteria for such a judgement would certainly consist in the fact that the 
information being considered is not available from any other sources. The 
American courts have already been led to àrgue in favour of essential facilities in 
cases of litigation concerning access to information carried in telephone directories. 
lt seems, however, that in the American understanding of the term, the data 
resource concerned must be vital to the competitiveness of the entity making the 
demand, 22 which is not the case if the information can be obtained elsewhere, no
matter at what cost, if the argument is to be carried to the point of forcing the 
communication of information. 
3. Dominant position and neighbouring market
Finally, it is once again through applying EEC article 86 that using one's 
dominant market position to attempt to dominate a neighbouring market has been 
judged illegal. 23 A government wishing to extend the position of dominance it
has gained, by reason of a legitimate public data service mission, to a market of 
complementary services, does so in contravention of Community law. This rule, 
combined with a strict definition of markets, as mentioned above, enables a 
20 Case 238/87, Volvo AB v. Eric Veng (UK) Ltd., (1988) ECR 6211. See also C-4l/90, Ho�ffner
& Elsner v. Macrotron, (1992). 
21 Sealink, 'Commission Press Release' IP (92) 478, June 1992. This ruling is commented by B. 
AMORY and P. SANDLER, Telephone Directories: the role of competition, 'Droit de la 
concurrence et services d'information', XIV th annual meeting of the Institute of the CCI, 27th 
and 28th November 1992, Paris, to be published. 
22 Rural Telephone Service Co, Inc v. Feist Publications, Inc, 957 F.2d 765 (10th Cir 1992). 
23 Case C- 18/88, RTTv. GB-INNO SA, (1991) ECR 5941. 
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dominant position to be kept within the limits of a restricted market and 
encourages the development of competition in neighbouring ones. 
To conclude, on the basis of EEC article 86, a government may not take 
advantage of a de facto dominant position deriving either from the reality of the 
situation or connected to certain exclusive and legitimate rights, whether to refuse 
to grant licences of exploitation, to grant them for exorbitant sums, to refuse the 
private sector access to its information resources in the event of these not being 
elsewhere available, or in order to extend its position to a neighbouring market. 
li 1 
' 
